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COUNTRY SOUTH VIETNAM	REPORT HO.	<u> </u>
SUNJECT COUP PLANS AND HESITATIONS OF GENERALS	DATE DISTR. 7 SEPTEMBER 1963	
DATE OF INFO.	REFERENCES IN 15Ø91	
THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION. SOURCE GRADINGS ARE IS	FIELD REPORT NO.	
SOURCE CHADROS ARE I	DEFINITIVE. APPRAISAL OF CONTENT IS TENTATIVE.	

1. TOP VIETNAMESE GENERALS ARE STILL CONSIDERING A COUP,
BUT THEY HAVE THUS FAR FAILED TO TAKE ACTION BECAUSE THEY WANT TO
BE ALMOST COMPLETELY CERTAIN OF SUCCESS BEFORE ACTING AND BECAUSE
THEY ARE HESITATING BETWEEN 3 OR 4 ALTERNATIVE PLANS OF ACTION.

CHARACTERIZED GENERALS

AS "ALMOST

TOO INTELLIGENT" THEY SEE THE DIFFICULTIES AND DANGERS TOO CLEARLY.

2. THE BASIC PROBLEM FOR THE GENERALS IS THAT THEY HAVE NO TROOPS. ONE WAY TO OBTAIN THEM WHICH THE GENERALS ARE SERIOUSLY CONSIDERING WOULD BE TO PERSUADE ONE REGIMENTAL OR DIVISION

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GENERAL WITH A SECURE TERRITORIAL BASE TO GO INTO DISSIDENCE.

GENERAL WITH HIS FOLLOWERS WOULD MOVE INTO THE REBEL ZONE

AND CALL UPON THE ARMY TO RALLY TO HIM AS CHIEF OF A PROVISIONAL

GOVERNMENT, AGAINST THE DIEM GOVERNMENT. COMMENT. WITH

GENERAL LE VAN TY NOW IN THE US AND PROBABLY DYING OF CANCER,

GENERAL MINH IS THE SENIOR GENERAL OF THE VIETNAMESE ARMY.)

THE AIR FORCE WOULD NOT BOMB SUCH

A REBEL ZONE.

THE GENERALS CONSIDERED THIS PLAN

WORKABLE, AS BEING MORE SURE OF SUCCESS THAN A PLAN TO SEIZE SAIGON

BY SURPRISE.

COMMENT. THE CHANCES OF SUCH A PLAN SUCCEEDING

WOULD,

BE 7Ø TO 8Ø PERCENT.) ITS PRINCIPAL

DISADVANTAGE WAS THAT IT WOULD PROBABLY INVOLVE CONSIDERABLE BLOODSHED,

AS IT WOULD HAVE TO BE ASSUMED THAT TROOPS LOYAL TO DIEM AND NHU

WOULD DEFEND SAIGON.

- 3. DID NOT DISCUSS ANY OTHER OF THE 3 OR 4 PLANS FOR A COUP WHICH ARE UNDER CONSIDERATION. DID INDICATE THAT WHILE IS THE PRINCIPAL DAI VIET CONTACT WITH THE GENERALS, WAS THEIR MAIN CONTACT WITH FIELD GRADE OFFICERS.
- 4. TRAN QUOC BUU, PRESIDENT OF THE GENERAL FEDERATION OF VIETNAMESE WORKERS (CVTC) WAS, A FOLLOWER MORE THAN A LEADER. HE WOULD ONLY ACT AFTER GENERALS HAD ACTED.

THE DIFFICULTY WAS THAT EVERYONE SEEMED TO WAITING FOR

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SOMEONE ELSE TO MAKE THE FIRST MOVE.

5.

DISSEM, STATE (THE AMBASSADOR ONLY) USMACV



CINCPAC PACELT ARPAC PACAF.

END OF MESSAGE

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